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 “Hardly Be Said to Offer An 
Education at All”: Endrew and its 
Impact on Special Education 
Mediation 
GRANT SIMON * 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the standards for special education students in America rise, the need to 
handle the resulting disputes arises as well.  Special education disputes are a com-
mon yet emotional process for all parties involved.  Such disputes can result in a 
split between the family and the school district- a split that can potentially leave 
negative consequences on the student.   In 1975, Congress, realizing the personal 
nature and prevalence of special education issues, passed what would become the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).1  The IDEA offers states fed-
eral funds to assist in educating children with disabilities.2  This Act also authorizes 
the child’s parents the right to make use of mediation for resolving these disputes.3  
This alternative dispute resolution process for special education claims solves thou-
sands of claims each year without having to pursue further litigation.4  However, in 
light of the recent Supreme Court decision Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. 
RE-1, the Court’s new and more demanding standard of what a child’s educational 
goals must be could potentially change the role of mediation in special education 
disputes. 
This Case Note discusses the recent Supreme Court decision in Endrew.5  The 
Case Note then will address the potential impact the Court’s ruling could have on 
the future role of mediation in special education.  Finally, this Case Note will also 
address the potential procedural changes school districts may have to make when 
considering the new Endrew standard. 
                                                        
* B.A. Truman State University 2015, J.D. University of Missouri 2019. I am incredibly grateful to Pro-
fessor James Levin for his feedback and guidance with this Comment. I would also like to thank the 
editorial staff of the Journal of Dispute Resolution for the time spent editing this Comment. Finally, I 
would like to thank my mother, Kathy McCarthy, for being my most influential guidance and sparking 
my interest in special education topics. 
 1. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2010). 
 2. See 20 U. S. C. §1400 (2010); see also Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 
U. S. 291, 295 (2006). 
 3. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2004). 
 4. Carolyn Thompson, Following Supreme Court ruling, more special education fights seen coming, 
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin (May 17, 2010), http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/Ar-
chives/2017/05/10/Special-ed-funding-5-10-17. 
 5. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). 
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Petitioner Endrew F. (“Endrew”) was a child with autism enrolled in respond-
ent Douglas County Colorado School District (“School District”) from preschool 
through fourth grade.6  During this time, Endrew was enrolled in special education 
courses with an Individual Educational Plan (“IEP”)7 created by School District 
employees.8  By the time Endrew reached the fourth grade, his parents believed that 
his academic progress had stalled.9  For evidence of this fear, Endrew’s parents 
noted that Endrew still exhibited behaviors that negatively impacted his ability to 
learn in the classroom.10  For example, Endrew would scream in class, climb over 
furniture and other students, and occasionally run away from school.11  He was also 
afflicted by severe fears of common everyday occurrences such as flies, spills, and 
public restrooms.12  However, despite Endrew’s parents concern about his progress 
stalling, Endrew’s IEP remained largely unchanged by carrying over the same basic 
goals and objectives from one year to the next.13  School District staff indicated that 
these goals were being carried over because Endrew was failing to make meaningful 
progress toward these goals.14 
When the School District proposed a fifth grade IEP that still failed to adjust 
Endrew’s goals, Endrew’s parents removed him from public school and enrolled 
him in a specialized private school for children with autism.15  At this school, En-
drew made significant educational progress rapidly.16  Concurrently, while Endrew 
was enrolled at his new private school, School District representatives approached 
Endrew’s parents with a new fifth grade IEP.17  Endrew’s parents considered this 
plan as inadequate as the original IEP, and, pursuant to statute, sought reimburse-
ment for his private school tuition by filing an IDEA complaint with the Colorado 
Department of Education.18 
To succeed on their complaint, Endrew’s parents had to show that the School 
District did not provide their son a Free and Appropriate Public Education 
                                                        
 6. Id. at 991. 
 7. The IEP is “the centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery system for disabled children” that 
identifies the unique needs a particular child needs to receive an adequate education.  See Honig v. Doe, 
484 U. S. 305, 311, (1988); see also Endrew, 137 S. Ct. 988 (noting that the IEP “is the means by which 
special education and related services are tailored to the unique needs of a particular child”). 
 8. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 991. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 996. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 996. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 997. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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(“FAPE”)19 as required by IDEA prior to his enrollment at the private school.20  
Endrew’s parents alleged that the final IEP proposed by the School District did not 
meet the required legal standard of being “reasonably calculated” to enable Endrew 
to receive his required educational benefits.21  Therefore, Endrew’s parents argued 
that Endrew had been denied a FAPE.22  The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 
denied relief, and Endrew’s parents appealed to the federal district court.23 
The district court, giving due weight to the ALJ’s decision, agreed with the 
ALJ that Endrew had not been denied a FAPE.24  However, while affirming the 
decision, the district court acknowledged that Endrew’s performance under past 
IEPs “did not reveal immense educational growth” but that, regardless, the School 
District still met its legal burden of providing FAPE for Endrew because the IEP 
objectives at least showed “minimal progress.”25  Because Endrew’s previous IEPs 
had enabled him to make at least minimal progress, the court reasoned that En-
drew’s latest IEP was reasonably calculated to do the same thing.26   In the federal 
district court’s view, that was all what the United States Supreme Court precedent 
and FAPE required.27 
Following the District Court’s decision to affirm the ALJ’s ruling, Endrew’s 
parents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.28  On review, the 
court affirmed the lower court,  reciting language from Supreme Court precedent 
stating that all the School District only had to offer Endrew was “some educational 
benefit.”29  The appellate court noted that it had long interpreted this language to 
mean that a child’s IEP is adequate and provides FAPE if the IEP is calculated to 
confer an “educational benefit [that is] merely . . . more than de minimis.”30  Apply-
ing this low standard, the Tenth Circuit held that Endrew’s IEP had been “reasona-
bly calculated to enable [him] to make some progress” and therefore he had not 
been denied FAPE.31  The Tenth Circuit also noted that it would not change this “de 
minimis” standard absent a superseding decision by the Supreme Court.” 32 
Following the Tenth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and overturned the lower courts.  The Court held that a “de minimis” educational 
benefit is not enough to provide a child with FAPE; rather, school districts must 
                                                        
 19. FAPE is a requirement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in order for 
the state government to receive federal funds to assist in educating children with disabilities.  See 20 
U.S.C. 1401 (2015); see also 20 U.S.C. 1412 (2015).  It is a guarantee of “a substantively adequate 
program of education to all eligible children, and that this requirement is satisfied if the child’s IEP sets 
out an educational program that is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational ben-
efits.”  See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester City v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 
176, 207 (1982). 
 20. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 997. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 997 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1340 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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offer children an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to enable each child to make 
progress appropriate for that child’s circumstances.”33 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and History of Student 
with Disabilities 
Requiring public education for children with serious disabilities is a recent his-
torical development.34   For much of American history, students with physical and 
mental disabilities were often excluded from public education solely because of 
their disabilities.35 
For example, in the late 19th century case Watson v. City of Cambridge, a stu-
dent was excluded from a public school in Cambridge, Massachusetts, by school 
officials “because he was too weak-minded to derive profit from instruction.”36  
This exclusion was eventually affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts (“SJC”).37   In affirming this student’s exclusion, the SJC noted that “by 
reason of imbecility, [the student] should not be permitted to continue in the 
school.”38 
In the 1950’s, children with disabilities were still excluded from public schools.  
For example, in Department of Welfare v. Haas39, Haas’ son was “described as 
mentally deficient, or feeble minded” and, because of his disability, had to be com-
mitted to a hospital for the “mentally deficient” outside of the public school sys-
tem.40  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the state, and that 
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois.41  In doing so, the court 
explicitly approved the exclusion of children with cognitive disabilities from public 
education, noting that right to a public school education implies that one must have 
capacity to receive such an education.42 
Prior to congressional action, more than one million American children had no 
access to the public school system.43  Recognizing the problem of excluding chil-
dren with disabilities from receiving an education, Congress passed the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975.44  In 1990, the act was re-codified as the 
Individuals with Disabilities Act.45   As the Supreme Court has recognized, the “fo-
cus on the particular child is at the core of the IDEA.”46   Today, the IDEA offers 
                                                        
 33. Id. at 1341. 
 34. Gary L. Monserud, Article: The Quest for a Meaningful Mandate for the Education of Children 
with Disabilities, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 675, 683 (2004). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 684. 
 38. Watson v. Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 865 (Mass. 1893). 
 39. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 154 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. 1958). 
 40. Id. at 268. 
 41. Id. at 274. 
 42. Id. at 270. 
 43. Jane West, Back to School on Civil Rights: Advancing the Federal Commitment to Leave No Child 
Behind, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY 6 (Jan. 25, 2000). 
 44. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 (1982). 
 45. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2010). 
 46. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017). 
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states federal funds to assist in educating children with disabilities.47  In exchange, 
a state must comply with a large number of statutory conditions.48  One of these 
conditions is that the state must provide a free and appropriate public education to 
all eligible children.49 Additionally, to satisfy the FAPE requirement, the state must 
have an Individualized Education Plan for all eligible children.50 
B.  Free and Appropriate Education 
To ensure the FAPE requirement is met, the IDEA imposes a variety of proce-
dural and substantive obligations on the state.51  While the procedural obligations 
that Congress intended are clearly and explicitly defined within IDEA, the substan-
tive rights and requirements are not.52   For the last forty years, the issue of what 
exactly a school must provide to meet the mandate of FAPE is an issue that has 
been litigated.53 
The procedural steps required by the IDEA focus on protecting the rights for 
children with disabilities and the children’s parents.54  These obligations include 
detailed procedures that school districts must follow when identifying, evaluating, 
and making educational decisions for a student suspected of being, or having been 
found to be, eligible for special education services.55   A school cannot label a stu-
dent for special education services as it pleases.56 
Key to protecting a student from improper labeling is IDEA’s exclusionary 
clause.57  The IDEA specifies, in part, that a learning problem which primarily re-
sults in an environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage cannot be the sole 
basis for placing a student in special education.58  The purpose of this exclusionary 
clause is to help specifically prevent the improper labeling of children, especially 
“those from distinct cultures who have acquired learning styles, language, or be-
haviors that are not compatible with academic requirements of schools in the dom-
inant culture.”59  However, this does not mean that individuals who met this criteria 
cannot also have other disabilities or be from different cultural backgrounds; it 
simply cannot be the primary cause behind a learning discretion.60  The exclusion-
ary clause today serves as one of the main procedural safeguards for the child.61 
                                                        
 47. See 20 U. S. C. §1400 (2010); see also Arlington Central Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 
U. S. 291, 295 (2006). 
 48. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2010). 
 49. 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(1) (2015). 
 50. 20 U.S.C. §1401(9)(D) (2015). 
 51. James Schwellenbach, Mixed Messages: An Analysis of the Conflicting Standards Used by the 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals when Awarding Compensatory Education for a Violation of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 53 ME. L. REV. 245, 251 (2001). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 54. Schwellenbach, supra note 51, at 252. 
 55. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C.§1412 (2015); 20 U.S.C. §1414 (2015). 
 56. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C) (2015). 
 57. National Association of Special Education Teachers, Introduction to Learning Disabilities, 
NASET.org, http://www.naset.org/2522.0.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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These procedural safeguards extend to the child’s parents as well.62  Parental 
protections include, but are not limited to, the parents’ right to participate in the 
educational programming and decision making for their child, the requirement of 
parental consent before any evaluation or placement, and the right to an impartial 
hearing in front of a third party if the parent is not satisfied with the school’s deci-
sions for their child.63  Also, as seen in Endrew, the IDEA also gives parents the 
right to file suit in state or federal court once administrative remedies have been 
exhausted.64 
However, despite how clearly defined IDEA’s FAPE procedural safeguards 
are, the only mention of substantive FAPE requirements from the IDEA are that: 
The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and re-
lated services that--(A) have been provided at public expense, under public super-
vision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educa-
tional agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
school education ...; and (D) are provided in conformity with [an] individualized 
educational program …65 
While dictating the requirement of certain key special education features (such 
as the requirement of an individualized education plan in order to provide a FAPE), 
the vagueness of the substantive standard supplied by the language of the IDEA has 
left the meaning and details of FAPE subject to administrative and judicial inter-
pretation.66 
Prior to Endrew, the Supreme Court first considered the substantive require-
ment of FAPE in the case in Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., 
Westchester Cty. v. Rowley.67 In Rowley, the Court held the Act guarantees an ade-
quate educational program to all special education children, and that this require-
ment is satisfied if the child’s IEP sets out an educational program that is “reason-
ably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.”68  The Court 
noted, for example, that, for children fully integrated in the regular classroom, this 
would typically require an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve 
passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”69  Because the IEP challenged in 
Rowley met this standard, the Court declined to establish a single concrete test for 
determining what the adequacy of the educational benefits must be.70  This lack of 
concrete test paved the way for the Tenth Circuit to decide educational benefits 
must merely be more than de minimis.71 
                                                        
 62. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). 
 63. Schwellenbach, supra note 51, at 252. 
 64. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2004). 
 65. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2015). 
 66. See Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A Study in the 
Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 366 (1990). 
 67. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 68. Id. at 206. 
 69. Id. at 204. 
 70. Id. at 202. 
 71. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 997 (2017). 
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C.  The Individual Education Plan 
As one of the few substantive requirements laid out by the IDEA, a state must 
provide a child an individualized education plan (IEP).72  The IEP is “the center-
piece of the statute’s education delivery system for disabled children.” 73  A com-
prehensive plan prepared by a child’s “IEP Team” (which includes teachers, school 
officials, and the child’s parents), an IEP must be drafted in compliance with a de-
tailed set of procedures.74  These procedures emphasize “collaboration among par-
ents and educators and require careful consideration of the child’s individual cir-
cumstances.” 75  The IEP is how special education and related services are made to 
serve the unique needs of a particular child.76 
The IDEA mandates “that every IEP include “a statement of the child’s present 
levels of academic achievement and functional performance,” describe “how the 
child’s disability affects the child’s involvement and progress in the general educa-
tion curriculum,” and set out “measurable annual goals, including academic and 
functional goals”. 77  Addition, the IDEA requires that the IEP contains a “descrip-
tion of how the child’s progress toward meeting” those goals will be gauged.78 The 
IEP must also describe the “special education and related services . . . that will be 
provided” so that the child may “advance appropriately toward attaining the annual 
goals” and, when possible, “be involved in and make progress in the general edu-
cation curriculum.”79 
Above all, the IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress in areas where 
the child is behind their peers.80  The instruction offered must be “specially de-
signed” to meet a child’s “unique needs” through an individualized education pro-
gram.81  An IEP is not a document to be created haphazardly; it requires careful 
consideration of the child’s present levels of achievement, disability, and potential 
for growth.82 
D.  The Role of Mediation Within the IDEA 
Mediation is defined as a “form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in 
which the parties to a lawsuit meet with a neutral third-party in an effort to settle 
the case.”83    Mediation differs from other forms of ADR such as arbitration because 
the third-party mediator plays a facilitative role that does not have the power to 
force a particular outcome.84  Because IDEA does not specify a mediation process, 
                                                        
 72. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) (2015). 
 73. Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305, 311 (1988). 
 74. 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(B) (2015). 
 75. See Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 994; see also 20 U.S.C. §1414 (2015). 
 76. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,191 (1982). 
 77. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 994; see also 20 U.S.C. §§1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(III) (2015). 
 78. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 994. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(IV) (2015). 
 81. Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 994. 
 82. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(IV), (d)(3)(A)(i)-(iv) (2015). 
 83. Mediation Law, HG.org, https://www.hg.org/mediation-definition.html (last visited Oct. 19, 
2017). 
 84. See Mediation, legal-dictionary.com, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/mediation 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2017). 
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a mediator has discretion about the exact steps of a mediation. 85  However, an often-
recognized model of mediation includes main six steps: introductory remarks, state-
ment of the problem by the parties, information gathering time, identification of the 
problems, bargaining and generating options, and reaching an agreement.86 
During the introductory remarks, the mediator will give an opening statement 
that outlines the role of the participants and demonstrates the mediator’s neutral-
ity.87  The mediator will then define the protocol and set the time frame for the 
process.88  Finally, the mediator will review the mediation guidelines and briefly 
recap the issues of the party.89 
After the opening statement, a mediator will often give each side the oppor-
tunity to tell their story uninterrupted.90  The party’s statement is not necessarily a 
recital of the facts, but it is meant to give the parties an opportunity to frame the 
issue as the parties’ view it.91  The rationale behind the statement of the problem “is 
not a search for the truth; it is just a way to help solve the problem” by helping each 
side better understand the perspective of the other.92 
The next step of a typical mediation process is informal information gather-
ing.93  During this step, the mediator will ask the parties open-ended questions to 
get as much information as possible.94  Dependent on the model of mediation used, 
the mediator may repeat the key points back to the parties while summarizing the 
dispute when possible.95  This helps the mediator build chemistry between the par-
ties.96 
Often, identifying the problem occurs during the information gathering stage.97  
Throughout the entire process, an effective mediator works with the party to find 
common goals.98  These goals help the mediator figure out which issues are going 
to be able to settle or which ones focused on by the parties.99 
A most commonly used method to settle disputes during mediation is the cau-
cus.100  This caucus session is often a confidential session for each party to com-
municate transparently with the mediator without the other side being present.101  
Once common ground between the parties is located through the caucus, a potential 
settlement can occur.102 
                                                        
 85. Grace E. D’Alo, Accountability In Special Education Mediation: Many a Slip ‘Twixt Vision and 
Practice?, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 205 (2001). 
 86. Jessica Stepp, How Does the Mediation Process Work?, MEDIATE.COM (Feb. 2003), 
http://www.mediate.com/articles/steppj.cfm. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id 
 92. Stepp, supra note 86. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Stepp, supra note 86. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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When Congress reauthorized the IDEA in 1997, it required that mediation be 
available as a choice whenever a due process hearing from a third party is re-
quested.103  There are several reasons why Congress began this mediation require-
ment.104  First, studies showed that mediation could resolve IDEA disputes more 
quickly and more cheaply than due process hearings.105  Second, due to its informal 
nature, mediation appeared to offer greater opportunity for participation by parents, 
guardians, and school officials.106  This continues IDEA’s emphasis on collabora-
tion for the betterment of the child’s education.107  Third, research showed that par-
ties were more likely to accept and implement agreements reached in mediation.108  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, mediation appeared to allow all parties to 
openly discuss their concerns and interests, potentially laying the groundwork for 
more effective future relationships.109 
As noted by Professor Grace E. D’Alo of Pennsylvania State University of 
Law, mediation literature commonly refers to three potential mediation models: fa-
cilitative-broad, evaluative-narrow and transformative.110  The IDEA does not spec-
ify what model special education mediation should follow.111  IDEA only states that 
mediation process must be voluntary and conducted by a “qualified and impartial 
mediator who is trained in effective mediation techniques.”112 
One of the models is known as “facilitative-broad” mediation.113  In this model, 
mediators “focus primarily on aiding the parties in self-understanding and com-
municating their underlying interests.”114  Mediators under this model act to help 
facilitate both parties’ dialogue but do not evaluate or judge the merits of each ar-
gument.115 
Another model is the “evaluative-narrow” mediation model.116  This model 
sees mediators focusing on the likely outcome if the dispute did not get resolved 
(which, in special education disputes, is often a due process hearing).117  In this 
model, the mediator’s role is to “provide the parties with an evaluation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each side’s case, the likely legal outcomes if the case 
proceeds to a hearing, and a determination of reasonable settlement terms.”118 
                                                        
 103. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 204 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2004)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (citing Jonathan A. Beyer, A Modest Proposal: Mediating IDEA Disputes Without Splitting the 
Baby, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 37, 45-46 (1999)). 
 106. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 204 (citing Jonathan A. Beyer, A Modest Proposal: Mediating IDEA 
Disputes Without Splitting the Baby, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 37, 47 (1999)). 
 107. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 204. 
 108. Id. (citing Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empir-
ical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 239 (1981)). 
 109. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 204 (citing Steven S. Goldberg & Dixie Snow Huefner, Dispute Resolu-
tion in Special Education: An Introduction to Litigation Alternatives, 99 EDUC. L. REP. 703, 705-06 
(1995)). 
 110. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 205. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A) (2004)). 
 113. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 205; see also Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and 
Techniques, CTR. FOR PUB. RESOURCES (Sept. 1994), https://www.starkmediator.com/wpcontent/up-
loads/sites/4/2013/10/Old_Riskin_Grid1994.pdf. 
 114. D’Alo, supra note 85, at 205. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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A third model recognized by mediation literature is the “transformative” medi-
ation model.119  In this model, mediators “focus their interventions on empowering 
the parties by helping them reach self-understanding and encouraging mutual recog-
nition of each other’s humanity and concerns.”120  Compared to the “evaluation-
marrow” model, a mediator is much less likely to provide an explicit evaluation of 
each side’s arguments and more likely to help each side understand the other’s point 
of view.121 
Special education mediation is a process in which both parties can be satisfied 
with the result.  For example, in 1997, Minnesota saw a high satisfaction rate among 
mediation participants, with 94% saying they would use the process again and 96% 
saying they would recommend mediation to others.122  Even as the actual success 
rate of the mediation process dropped over 10% in subsequent years, the satisfaction 
rates among participants have remained consistent.123   Mediation allows both par-
ties to be satisfied with a result while avoiding costly litigation.124 
The prevalence of special education mediation itself has been declining prior 
to the Endrew decision.  For example, the rate of special education mediation has 
decreased from 2004 to 2012 as due process hearings dropped from under 7,000 to 
slightly above 2,000 nationwide.125  When such mediations do take place, they often 
successfully resolve the parties’ concerns.  For example, mediations between 2004 
to 2012, almost 70% of mediations resulted in agreements.126  These signed, written 
mediation agreements are legally enforceable in any state or federal court.127 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
With Chief Justice Roberts writing for a unanimous court, the Supreme Court 
held that for a school to meet its substantive FAPE obligation under the IDEA, it 
must offer an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appro-
priate in light of the child’s circumstances.”128 
The Court’s “reasonably calculated” qualification reflects a recognition that 
crafting an appropriate educational program for a child requires a variety of view-
points (from school official’s expertise to the view of a child’s parents) and is con-
sistent with the function of an IEP’s goal of a child’s advancements.129  The Court 
noted that the potential progress contemplated by the IEP “must be appropriate in 
light of the child’s circumstances” and therefore a concrete guidance is not appro-
priate in this case.130 
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 The Court noted that Rowley shed a light on what appropriate progress will 
look like in many cases.131  As seen in Rowley, a child fully integrated in the regular 
classroom should have an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to 
achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”132   However, a child’s 
IEP does not need to aim for grade-level advancement if that is not a reasonable 
expectation.133  Still, while a child’s goals may differ, the Court noted that “every 
child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives.”134  In addition, the 
Court noted that an absence of a concrete bright-line rule should not be mistaken 
for “an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational 
policy for those of the school authorities which they review.”135 
However, this decision was not a complete victim for Endrew’s parents.  In 
coming to this decision, the Court rejected Endrew’s parents’ argument that the 
IDEA requires States to provide children with disabilities educational opportunities 
that are “substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabili-
ties.”136  However, because the Court rejected this view in Rowley and Congress 
had not changed this standard after the decision, the Court did not accept this view 
now.137 
V.  COMMENT 
A.  Endrew Was Correctly Decided 
In rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s “de minimis” standard, the Supreme Court cor-
rectly decided that the IDEA required more from FAPE.   As discussed during oral 
arguments, the Supreme Court justices and the School District’s counsel could not 
pinpoint the origins of the “de minimis” standard.138  The standard was not con-
sistent with any previous Supreme Court ruling yet somehow was applied by the 
majority of federal courts.139   As noted by Jeffrey Fisher, who was Endrew’s par-
ents counsel, these courts needed “a kick” as the application of the “de minimis” 
standard lead to inconsistent outcomes throughout the country.140    The Supreme 
Court correctly gave these courts the kick they deserved, recognizing that such a 
standard had no basis in special education law. 
Furthermore, this low standard was recently condemned by multiple federal 
legislators from both major political parties.141  For example, during Justice Neil 
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Gorsuch’s Supreme Court confirmation hearings, the Endrew decision was an-
nounced.142  Justice Gorsuch was a member of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
who, while not directly involved with the Endrew decision, had previously used the 
“de minimis” standard to rule against similar special education claims.143   In re-
sponse to Endrew, multiple senators such as Democrats Chuck Schumer and Dick 
Durbin and Republican John Cornyn questioned Justice Gorsuchfor applying the 
now-rejected standard.144     In response to this questioning, Justice Gorsuch admit-
ted that the decision to apply the low standard was wrong, and he apologized.145 
Additionally, the use of the “de minimis” standard cannot logically be con-
sistent with multiple landmark educational acts.  For example, the No Child Left 
Behind Act in 2004 was a revolutionary and bipartisan policy change for American 
public-school education.146  No Child Left Behind intended to increase the measur-
able educational standards that students and educators were evaluated by while sim-
ultaneously aiming for academic growth throughout America.147   Allowing the 
courts to apply a “de minimis” standard for special education student growth clearly 
conflicts with this bipartisan legislative action. 
In addition, as the Supreme Court noted, it cannot be consistent with the IDEA 
to allow a normal functioning student to aim for grade level improvement year after 
year but hold a special education student to a much lower standard.148  Therefore, 
because of the lack of judicial support and legislative intent behind the “de minimis” 
standard, the Court was correct to overturn the standard’s usage. 
The Court was also correct in rejecting Endrew’s parent’s suggestion of “sub-
stantially equal” standard.   A standard of aiming for grade to grade level improve-
ment for all special education children’s IEP would be unworkable for schools and 
courts.   In addition, it would ignore the student’s individuality that drives IDEA’s 
purpose.  For example, today special education requirements and services apply to 
a wide range of disabilities (i.e. Down Syndrome, Attention Deficit Disorder, and 
countless more).149  To say that a child with Down Syndrome is entitled to a “sub-
stantially equal” goal as a general education student’s grade-to-grade progress or as 
an ADHD student is unrealistic and not fair to the student.150  Such a goal is not 
only unattainable for the student with Down Syndrome, but potentially detrimental 
to the child since, by ignoring the student’s individual disability, it is likely that the 
child would not be getting the best tailored individual services he needs.    Since 
Rowley, the Supreme Court has correctly recognized that a concrete standard for 
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FAPE is not possible due to the individualized nature of special education.151  
Therefore, Endrew was correct in not only rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s “de mini-
mis” standard but also rejecting Endrew’s parents proposed “substantially equal” 
standard as well. 
B.  Endrew Could Lead To An Increase and Change to Special Education 
Mediation. 
As noted during oral arguments, the Endrew decision has the potential to im-
pact over 8 million special education IEPs.152  While special education disputes 
rarely find their way to courts, the Supreme Court recognized that this ruling had 
the potential to massively increase special education litigation.153   With this in-
crease of litigation looming, it is possible Endrew could drastically change the pro-
cess and role of special education mediation going forward. 
Traditionally, one of the concerns of special education mediation is that it can 
significantly advantage the school over the parents or the child.154   Mediations are 
private matters often meant to protect school reputation.155   Furthermore, ethical 
concerns can arise since the state pays for the mediator to settle the dispute for state 
funded schools.156  Also, schools can be “repeat players”, therefore school admin-
istrators are more likely than parents to be knowledgeable about the mediation and 
IDEA processes.157    These advantages could result in the parents or the child hav-
ing less power or control over the course of the mediation process than they should. 
However, in light of Endrew, parents and students potentially could see an in-
crease in mediation advantages.   For example, in an evaluative mediation model 
where the mediator provides the parties with an evaluation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each side’s case and the likely legal outcomes, Endrew ensures that 
the child is guaranteed by law a higher standard than “de minimis.”    Therefore, an 
evaluative mediator would recognize that Endrew weakened a school’s case or po-
tential legal outcome if a school really was only providing a child a minimal benefit.   
This recognition could serve to mitigate the traditional advantage schools receive 
in the mediation process.   As Daniel Unumb, executive director of the Autism 
Speaks Legal Resource Center, noted “[o]nce there’s an appropriate standard in 
place and it’s understood that that is the standard that needs to be met, I think that 
goes a long way to improving mediation and to improving attempts to avoid litiga-
tion.”158 
In addition to the changes to the mediation process, the sheer number of special 
education mediation may increase directly as a result of Endrew.  While declining 
in recent years, with as many as 8 million IEPs facing a potentially higher standard, 
mediation could be the most efficient and effective method to solve this potentially 
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massive increase in disputes.  If special education mediation is unsuccessful, the 
cost to continue pursuing the special education claim is expensive.  Further hearings 
after mediation can cost both sides tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees.159  Fur-
thermore, if a court finds a special education claim frivolous, all attorney’s fees can 
be redirected back to the parents.160 
For example, Jackie Pioli settled her dispute with her son’s Connecticut school 
district just because further hearings would have costed the family as much as 
$75,000 in legal fees, on top of the $25,000 already spent on representation.161  If 
she knew the process would be so expensive, Pioli said she would have paid the 
$45,000 tuition herself for the private school she wanted for her son to attend.162  In 
addition to these costs, special education claims can be time consuming.  For exam-
ple, in Endrew, Endrew was in fourth grade when the issue of the case occurred and 
was seventeen years old by the time his case reached the Supreme Court.163   With 
almost 60% of children in special education throughout the United States living at 
or below the federal poverty level, continuing a claim past mediation is often not 
feasible.164 
Therefore, because of the new standard adopted by Endrew, the process and 
amount of special education mediation could drastically change in the future. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Faced with its most significant special education case in decades, the Supreme 
Court held that that a “de minimis” educational benefit is not enough to provide a 
child with FAPE; rather, school districts must offer children IEP that is “reasonably 
calculated to enable each child to make progress appropriate for that child’s circum-
stances.”  In recognizing this higher standard, the Court rejected the test used by the 
Tenth Circuit and the majority of federal courts to assess special education claims.   
This higher standard was correctly decided in light of past Supreme Court decisions 
and recent landmark educational act legislative intention.  However, as a direct re-
sult of Endrew, the special education mediation process might change as it becomes 
the most efficient matter to deal with the potential massive amount of change this 
higher standard brings.    As Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts noted, if 
the de minimis standard could continue, special education students would “hardly 
be said to have been offered an education at all.”165 
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